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Abstract: 
 
Based on field surveys conducted in Guangdong, Zhejiang and Beijing in 
2000 and 2001, this paper argues that accession to the WTO by China will create a 
new competitive arena for different categories of textile and clothing firms located 
in that country, partly dependent on the size and ownership of the firm. From the 
perspectives of reducing import tariffs, eliminating export quotas and the 
regulations on trade disputes, WTO accession does matter for the majority of 
Chinese firms in this “win-lose” game. From the perspective of compliance with 
international standards, this paper argues that accession to the WTO does not 
really matter for some Chinese firms as they may not survive the intense 
competition until 2005, when the effects of the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing materialises. 
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 1. Introduction 
After the Chinese delegate signed the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
accord in 2001, China formally agreed to the accession treaties after 15 years of 
on-and-off negotiations.1 Setting aside general discussions, such as those 
contained in Kong (2000) and Woo (2001), most of the literature about WTO 
accession by China has focused on three themes. The first is the impact of WTO 
accession on the vitality of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, e.g. 
Blumental (1999), Liu and Woo (2001), etc. The second is the implications of 
WTO accession for foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade 
between China and other developed countries, e.g. Wang (1999), Ianchovichina 
and Martin (2001), etc. The third comprises sector-specific studies about WTO 
accession, e.g. agriculture (Yamamoto, 2000), automobiles (Harwitt, 2001), 
pharmaceuticals (Yeung, 2002A), banking and finance (Langlois, 2001), and the 
telecommunications sector (DeWoskin, 2001), etc. Most of the literature about the 
implications of WTO accession on the Chinese textile and clothing industry is 
either in Chinese or far from comprehensive, e.g. Chen (2000), Tang (2000), Yang 
and Zhong (1998), Yang (1999), Zhong and Yang (2000), etc. Shi (2000, 2001) 
has conducted a thorough investigation of the industry but it is in Chinese. 
Furthermore, the above (econometric) studies are largely based on two 
assumptions: the expanding market for Chinese firms after the elimination of 
quotas, and uniform performance in the industry (i.e. not taking the differences 
between firms’ size and ownership types into consideration). These convenient 
assumptions are neither logically sound nor able to address satisfactorily the 
following issue: “Does WTO accession matter?” 
To fill this gap in the literature, this paper investigates the extent to which 
China’s accession to the WTO will change the competitive landscape of both 
foreign-financed and locally-funded Chinese textile and clothing firms.2 The 
discussion focuses on the effects of the WTO accession treaties and the sector-
specific international standards on the competitiveness of the Chinese firms. Apart 
from taking the size and ownership types of the firms into consideration, this 
paper does not assume that WTO accession has a positive impact on the 
competitiveness of the Chinese industry. Being the largest producer and exporter 
 of textiles and clothing in the world since 1995, China’s WTO accession has 
tremendous implications for the development of the industry globally. 
To examine these issues, informal interviews with government officials 
and semi-structured interviews with the owners and managers of 15 textile and 
clothing firms located in Guangdong, Zhejiang and Beijing were conducted by the 
authors in April-May of 2000 and August of 2001. The interviews and firm visits 
were conducted with the help of various institutes in China, especially the 
Management Commission of the Hangzhou Economic and Technology 
Development Zone in Zhejiang province, and, in Guangdong province, the Bureau 
for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade in Guangzhou and the Guangdong 
Provincial Research Centre for Economic Development. Every Sinologist knows 
that securing the appropriate personal connections is probably the most important 
precondition for conducting visits to firms in China. This explains why most of 
the firms investigated are located in Guangdong (6 cases) or Zhejiang (7 cases) 
provinces. Unsurprisingly, most of the firms located in Guangdong are financed 
by Hong Kong-based entrepreneurs, whilst most of the firms visited in Zhejiang 
are financed by Taiwanese or Japanese (partly due to the relative proximity of 
Taiwan and Japan to this province, and to their historical ties with Zhejiang). 
Each interview and firm visit was lasted for at least an hour and the 
questions focused on factors, especially with regard to the WTO accession treaties, 
that might affect the competitiveness of textile and clothing firms in China. For 
instance, to what extent will the elimination of trade barriers, including the 
reduction of import tariffs and export quotas, affect the competitiveness of the 
Chinese textile and clothing industry? The field survey co-ordinators (including 
several government officials) accompanied the researchers during the interviews 
and firm visits, but they never intervened in the interviews. The interviewees were 
willing to share their opinions on issues related to the WTO accession with us, 
including, on several occasions, criticisms against the government for being 
secretive and about the lack of preparation for the WTO accession, in front of the 
government officials (see the main text). One of the advantages of using semi-
structured interviews is that the interviewees were allowed to discuss issues not 
directly related to the WTO accession, but vital for the competitiveness of the 
 industry, e.g. the proliferation of international standards (see the main text). This 
proved to be essential for us in assessing the central research question in this paper: 
Does WTO accession matter?  
The sample firms ranged across various investment formats: wholly 
foreign-owned ventures (7 cases), equity joint ventures (4 cases), processing and 
assembling (2 cases) and locally-funded (2 cases).3 With the exception of three 
smaller sized firms (two processing and assembly clothing firms in Guangdong 
and another locally-funded clothing firm in Zhejiang), all of the others were large-
scale firms with registered capital of at least several million U.S. dollars and 
employing several hundreds to thousands of workers. The samples incorporate 
mainly the subsidiaries of transnational corporations (TNCs), major sub-
contractors for designer brand clothing or major department stores in the U.S. and 
Europe, e.g. Kellwood, Macy’s, J. C. Penney, K-mark, etc. The sample size is 
relatively small but representative of the industry, especially of the foreign-
financed textile and clothing firms in China. 
The global and Chinese textile and clothing industries will be discussed 
briefly in the next section, before we investigate the possible impact of China’s 
WTO accession in section 3. The analysis will focus on three perspectives: export 
quotas and import tariffs, anti-dumping and other trade disputes, and international 
standards. The policy implications of this paper will be highlighted in section 4. 
2. The textile and clothing industry 
2.1 The global textile and clothing industry 
The international textile and clothing trade is dominated by a small 
number of economies, i.e. China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Mexico, India, Italy, 
the United States, Germany, etc. (Table 1). The top ten exporting countries 
accounted for 53-67% of the global export value of textile and clothing products 
in the 1990s. With the exception of the U.S., the diminishing share of the export 
value of developed countries (DCs) is offset by the increasing market share of the 
less developed countries (LDCs) in Asia, especially China, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and South Korea. The global market share of Chinese textile and clothing 
 products increased from 4.6% in 1980 to 14% (US$52.21 billion) in 2000. In 
terms of revealed comparative advantage indices, the clothing industry (0.433) 
had a much stronger comparative advantage than the textile industry (0.114) in 
China in 2000.4 This is partly due to the massive relocation of export-oriented 
clothing firms from Hong Kong to southern China since the 1980s to reap the 
much lower factor costs. For instance, wages in southern China are about 15-20% 
of those in Hong Kong, even taking the differences in labour productivity into 
consideration. Subsequently, Hong Kong’s share of the value of global exports 
decreased from 11.5% in 1980 to 5% in 2000. Since 1995, China has been the 
largest exporting country for textile and apparel products in the world (WTO, 
2001D). 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
The top ten importing countries accounted for a majority (77%) of the 
global import value of textile and clothing products in the 1990s (Table 1). The 
share of the global import value by three DCs, the U.S., the United Kingdom and 
Japan, increased significantly from about 14-27% in 1980 to 16-47% in 2000. In 
2000, European Union countries accounted for a massive 41%, while North 
America accounted for another 34% of world apparel import values. The U.S. is 
the largest market, accounting for almost 10% (US$15.71 billion) of the global 
import value of textile products and about one-third (US$66.39 billion) of that of 
apparel in 2000. China was also a major importing country of textile products 
during the 1990s, e.g. reached US$12.83 billion in 2000 (WTO, 2001D). This is 
reconciled by the fact that most foreign-financed firms in China prefer to import 
fibre or fabric to control the quality of their products. 
Given the tremendous politico-economic implications for the continuous 
“industrial hollowing out” of the West, it is not surprising that textiles and 
clothing is probably one of the hardest-fought issues in international trade disputes. 
To regulate the unilateral imposition of market restrictions, 54 major exporting 
and importing countries signed the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA, formally the 
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles) in January 1974, under 
the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The major 
treaties of the MFA are, as follows (WTO, 2001A): 
 • “Market disruption”: importing countries can unilaterally impose export 
quotas for two years against exporting countries, when bilateral negotiations 
fail to settle disputes.  
• The quotas allocated to exporting countries have been increased by 6% per 
annum. 
• “Reasonable departures”: importing countries can depart from the MFA rules 
temporarily under the special circumstances of “market disruption.” 
Despite being a major departure from the GATT’s principle of non-
discrimination, textile and clothing quotas were negotiated bilaterally between 
importing and exporting countries under the MFA. A number of LDCs lobbied for 
a reduction in the trade barriers erected by the DCs and for the conclusion of the 
MFA during the GATT negotiations. This resulted in the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing (ATC). Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations on 1 January 1995, the ATC is a transitional instrument and applies 
to all WTO member countries (including non-MFA signatories). The major 
treaties of the ATC are, as follows (WTO, 2001B, 2001C): 
• The progressive integration of textile and clothing products into the GATT 
1994 rules in four stages (1 January of 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005, 
respectively). 
• The progressive enlargement of existing export quotas by increasing the 
annual growth rate at each stage, until they are eliminated on 1 January 2005.5 
• A special safeguard mechanism to deal with new cases of serious damage or 
threat to domestic manufacturers during the transition period.6 
• The establishment of a Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) to supervise the 
implementation of the ATC, including rules on circumvention of quotas via 
transhipment, re-routing, false declaration of origin, falsification of official 
documents, etc.7 
Despite the regulations of international treaties, China and several LDCs 
are becoming major players in the global textile and clothing industry. It is 
important to have a brief overview of the Chinese industry, before assessing the 
possible impact of WTO accession. 
2.2 The Chinese textile and clothing industry 
 Despite being the largest textiles exporting country in the world since 1995, 
further development of the Chinese industry is constrained by its unique 
ownership and industrial structure, largely the legacy of the planned economy. In 
terms of industrial structure, valuable financial resources are being drained 
through the existence of tens of thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) proliferating all over the country. A number of them are supporting a 
significant proportion of the fiscal budgets of financially independent local 
governments. This partly explains why the number of firms exploded from 37,900 
in 1980 to 102,500 in 15 years, and why the number of employees have doubled 
to 12.43 million (Table 2). However, the majority of firms are simply too small.8 
For instance, in 1995, the average number of employees was 121/firm, the gross 
annual industrial output was only 8.19 million yuan/firm and the annual profit tax 
was 259,700 yuan/firm. They neither benefit from economies of scale nor are 
competitive in the international market. This is especially the case in the cotton 
and wool spinning sectors, where only 10% of the cotton spindles are on a par 
with international standards. The cotton weaving machines are even more obsolete: 
only 15% are the automatic doffer type, and 94% of 824,000 machines are the out-
dated shuttle-loom type. In terms of export value, foreign-financed firms in the 
form of sanzi qiye (it incorporates equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures 
and wholly foreign-owned ventures) alone accounted for 34% of the total export 
value of the Chinese textile and clothing industry in 1999. The export of textile 
products is mainly focused on fabrics for clothing, while higher value-added 
textile products for decorative purposes and industrial use is almost non-existent 
(Chen, 2000, p. 130; Shi, 2001, pp. 89,155). 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
In terms of ownership, the SOEs in general are performing badly. In 1996, 
about 55% of the 3,061 state-owned firms were loss-making (the losses incurred 
by 1,667 firms were 11.17 billion yuan and the state-owned textiles industry was 
in the red to the tune of 8.35 billion yuan). In 1999, there were about 41% of 
4,247 state-owned textile firms still suffering from losses (the state-owned textiles 
industry was still losing 0.37 billion yuan) (NBS, 2000). The output share of state-
owned textile firms declined dramatically to less than 25%. Moreover, the central 
 government pays subsidies of 60 billion yuan to the state-owned textiles industry 
every year in low-cost loans, financial subsidies, workers welfare payments, bad 
debt re-financing, and so forth. (Shi, 2001, pp. 78,120-1).  
To improve industrial competitiveness, the central government established 
the National Textile and Clothing Industry Bureau and the China Textile and 
Clothing Association. In 1998, the government implemented a “restructuring, 
downsizing and efficiency” policy: to phase out 10 million obsolete cotton 
spinning machines, reduce employment in the textiles industry and return the 
state-owned textiles industry to profitability within three years. Subsequently, the 
number of firms decreased from 102,500 in 1995 to 24,500 in 2001, and the 
number of employees decreased from 12.43 million to 5.07 million 
simultaneously (Table 2). In 2001, the annual gross value of industrial output 
increased to 44.13 million yuan/firm (profits tax of 1.66 million yuan/firm in 
1999).  
Due to the existing ownership and industrial structure of the Chinese 
textile and clothing industry, it is clear that not every firm in China will gain after 
the WTO accession. 
3. Competitiveness of the Chinese textile and clothing 
industry: Does WTO accession matter 
According to the WTO accord signed in 2001, the major areas of 
liberalisation related to the textile and clothing industry are, as follows (White 
House, 2000; MOFTEC, 2001): 
• Export quotas and anti-dumping: 
ª The deal incorporates the ATC, signed in 1995, under which the MFA 
restrictions (export quotas) will be phased out by 1 January 2005.9 
ª The special safeguard mechanism to prevent a surge of imports will 
remain in effect until 31 December 2008 (rather than 2004 as laid down by 
the ATC). The product-specific safeguard which determines the market 
disruption caused by a specific product will remain in force for 12 years 
after Chinese accession. 
 ª The importing countries will treat China as a “non-market economy” in 
future anti-dumping and countervailing cases for 15 years after Chinese 
accession.10 
• Import tariffs, import quotas and licences: 
ª Tariffs will be reduced from the current average of 25.4% to an average of 
11.7% by 1 January 2005. 
ª Import quotas and other quantitative restrictions will increase from the 
current trade level of 15% per annum and be phased out no later than 2005. 
• Trading and distribution rights: 
ª Comprehensive trading and distribution rights in China, including the 
provision of goods made in China, will be granted to foreign-financed 
firms progressively over three years. 
• SOEs: 
ª China will ensure that the sales and purchases of SOEs and state-invested 
enterprises (SIEs) are based solely on commercial considerations rather 
than on “government procurement.” 
ª The SOEs and SIEs are regulated under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, e.g. no export subsidies, no soft loans, etc. 
It is obvious that the WTO accession treaties will affect the Chinese textile 
and clothing industry in two major areas: (1) the reduction of import tariffs and 
the elimination of export quotas, and (2) the possibility of trade disputes between 
China and her major trading partners. This paper will address these two aspects of 
WTO-related issues in turn, before discussing the proliferation of international 
standards and how it affects the competitiveness of the Chinese industry. 
3.1 Import tariffs and export quotas 
It is generally argued that textile and clothing firms in China will benefit 
from the reduction of import tariffs and the eventual elimination of export quotas, 
e.g. Zhang (2000, pp. 134-7), Bach et al. (2000). They can import their raw 
materials and machines at much lower tariffs, which will reduce their production 
costs and improves their competitiveness. They will also be able to export their 
finished products without worrying about the availability of export quotas after 
2005. This is equivalent to a sudden increase in the size of overseas markets. 
 Zhong and Yang (2000, p. 187) estimate that China will gain US$13.1 billion in 
2005 (about 30% of the increase being in exports of textiles and 142% in those of 
clothing). Some entrepreneurs expect that the export value of the Chinese textiles 
industry will reach US$68 billion by 2005 (Field survey, 2001). 
This rosy “win-win” scenario may be based on sound logical grounds. 
Nonetheless, its optimistic conclusion is based on an unrealistic assumption: that 
the global market for Chinese firms will increase after the elimination of export 
quotas in 2005, e.g. Yang et al. (1997). In reality, the elimination of export quotas 
may not actually lead to an increase in market size for Chinese firms, since the 
present official export figures exclude an unknown value of illegal shipments. It is 
a “public secret” that a number of (foreign-financed) firms in China are exploiting 
the loopholes on country of origin (via transhipments and re-routing). Therefore, it 
is argued that the elimination of exports quotas by importing countries in 2005 
may or may not increase the market size for Chinese firms. In fact, the 
elimination of export quotas will benefit those firms who are exploiting the 
loopholes on country of origin. First, they will no longer have to use various 
means to deliver their products to the U.S./EU. Second, they are likely to secure 
more orders from U.S./EU markets since they are already very competitive there, 
as their present production costs are inflated by the high transaction costs of 
dealing with the documentation on country of origin and the very high 
transhipments costs. Third, they have established networks of customers. As long 
as their prices remain competitive, foreign buyers are likely to keep their existing 
sub-contractors rather than venture out to do business with other suppliers with 
unknown qualifications, both in terms of quality control and reliability of product 
delivery (Field survey, 2001). 
Contrary to general perceptions, foreign firms who invested in southern 
China before the WTO accession do not necessarily enjoy the “first mover” 
advantage, mainly due to the elimination of export quotas. The ability to use Hong 
Kong export quotas has been one of the greatest competitive advantages of 
foreign-financed firms located in southern China since the 1980s, where the 
majority of them are operating under outward-processing arrangements. The 
labour-intensive manufacturing processes are conducted in Guangdong, while the 
 semi-finished products are then exported to Hong Kong for final value-added 
work before being legitimately exported to overseas markets (with labels of 
“Made in Hong Kong”). Foreign investors can enjoy both the lower production 
costs in Guangdong and the less restrictive Hong Kong export quotas assigned by 
the U.S. government. After the elimination of export quotas in 2005, the 
competitive advantages that foreign-financed firms derive from dividing their 
manufacturing processes between Guangdong and Hong Kong will diminish 
rapidly, if not be eliminated. To remain competitive internationally, the large-
scale foreign-financed firms in Guangdong have been moving up the value-added 
chain during the last few years in anticipation of Chinese accession to the WTO 
(Field survey, 2000, 2001; Yeung, 2002B).11 
With their limited design capability and limited capital to invest in 
advanced equipment, however, SMEs are less likely to be able to up-grade to 
higher value-added manufacturing processes which demand stringent quality 
controls. A number of foreign-financed SMEs are expected to close down before 
2005. First, they are producing low value-added and out-of-fashion fabrics or 
apparel. Second, their “real” production costs are higher than those of TNCs due 
to the lower level of automated manufacturing. For example, a Taiwanese-
financed textile firm pays 6.8 yuan to produce one kilogram of yarn, compared to 
6.5 yuan/kg for TNCs. Third, their production costs are higher than those of 
locally-funded firms (which do not subscribe mandatory labour and medical 
insurance) (Field survey, 2000, 2001).  
For locally-funded firms who focus on the Chinese market, the reduction 
of import tariffs and the opening up of distribution channels in China are 
equivalent to an increase in competition from foreign-financed firms and imported 
products. They have cost advantages in low value-added fibre and apparel, but not 
in high value-added products. The Chinese fibre industry is already experiencing 
intense competition, and a number of SMEs have closed during the last two years. 
Those who are still operating are just able to survive through established customer 
networks (Ibid.). Since the foreign-financed firms in China are no longer 
constrained by their production contracts and other Customs documentation, they 
can sell their products locally and at competitive prices (they can either source 
 their raw materials locally or imported them at lower tariffs).12 The subsidiaries of 
TNCs can also expand their retail chains in China and import their brand name 
apparel without paying high tariffs. It is therefore expected that the crowding out 
process of cost-inefficient firms with obsolete equipment producing low quality, 
out-of-fashion products will be accelerated. This will shorten the transitional 
period of industrial restructuring, thus improving the long-term competitiveness of 
the Chinese industry. This “win-lose” scenario is not revealed by conventional 
econometric studies, such as those of Yang et al. (1997) and Zhong and Yang 
(2000, pp. 188-90), which report large gains to Chinese industry from WTO 
membership, or those of Ianchovichina and Martin (2001, p. 21), which estimate 
that China will account for up to 47% of global clothing exports by 2005. 
3.2 Anti-dumping and other trade disputes 
The role of the Chinese central government in the resolution of disputes 
with the country’s trading partners is vital for the competitiveness of textile and 
clothing firms in China during the 15 years transitional period after the WTO 
accession, during which the U.S./EU can still use its current anti-dumping 
methodology. Moreover, the U.S./EU’s special safeguard and product-specific 
safeguard mechanisms will not be phased out until 2008 and 2014, respectively. 
In other words, WTO accession will eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the 
annual renewal of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) by the U.S., but it 
will not reduce the possibility of trade disputes between China and other countries 
for at least another 15 years.13  
The fact that China ranked first in the world on anti-dumping suits filed by 
her trading partners in 2002 (about 540 suits covering 4,000 products, involving 
33 countries and worth US$16 billion) highlights the potential scale of future trade 
disputes (CD, 10 December 2002). The Chinese industry was not well informed, 
as the government did not distribute documents related to WTO treaties before 
their delegates signed the agreement in November 2001. Once the Chinese firms 
refuse to co-operate with the anti-dumping investigations, the U.S./EU’s 
regulatory authorities have no choice but to accept the pricing information 
provided by the accusers (Western firms). If China is admitted into the WTO with 
the status of a “transitional economy,” the regulatory authorities should compare 
 local production costs (or the representative price of the product exported to a 
third country) when determining whether a firm is guilty of dumping. In reality, 
however, the information on production costs provided by the accusers can be 
misleading, since the current anti-dumping methodology treats China as a “non-
market economy.” This means that the U.S./EU regulatory authorities can use 
third country reference prices to determine the existence of state subsidies or the 
dumping. When the export price of the accused firm is lower than the reference 
market prices in the third country, foreign competitors would then raise the 
accusation that the “dumping” is causing material injury to the industry that is 
producing a “like product” in the importing country. Anti-dumping duties are then 
imposed on the product to maintain a “level-playing field” for Western firms 
should the exporting firm refuse to increase its price to the “non-dumping” level 
(Field survey, 2001; WTO, 2002)! 
When anti-dumping duties are imposed on Chinese firms by importing 
countries, the firms can first try to resolve the trade disputes by appealing to the 
Chinese government. If the Fair Trade Bureau for Import and Export finds enough 
evidence to support the appeal, it will then represent the Chinese central 
government in negotiating directly with the authorities of the importing countries. 
If the negotiations fail to achieve satisfactory results, the Chinese government can 
complain to the WTO and ask that the issue be settled by its Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) (Potter, 2001, p. 601).14  
Since the Chinese government may not be well prepared for the WTO 
accession, the Chinese industry faces an uphill battle in any future trade disputes. 
China had not established any specific department to deal with potential trade 
disputes until November 2001, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation’s (MOFTEC) legal team remains understaffed (SCMP, 2 November 
2001; CD, 8 October 2002).15 The lack of co-ordination within, and between, 
different bureaux to administer foreign trade policy efficiently, further undermines 
the investigation of counter-anti-dumping cases (Potter, 2001, pp. 600-1). For 
instance, there are no other Customs officers to follow up the case when the 
officer in charge is on annual or sick leave. Worse still, it is not uncommon for 
two or more bureaux in the local government to have their senior officers on 
 annual leave simultaneously (especially during the Chinese Lunar New Year). In 
arbitration cases, managers only meet with a “wall of silence,” receiving advice 
such as “I don’t deal with this; come back in two weeks when Mr. X is back!” 
(Field survey, 2001). The competitors of Chinese-based firms are fully supported 
by their countries’ regulatory authorities, whilst some of the corresponding 
officers in the Chinese government may have inherited the “legacy” of the 
planned economy.  
In general, most of the large-scale foreign-financed (especially Taiwanese- 
and Hong Kong-financed) textile and clothing firms have years of experience in 
dealing with anti-dumping suits launched by the U.S. or the EU. They know how 
to navigate through the minefield of anti-dumping allegations. They also have the 
capital to recruit lawyers to prepare for counter-anti-dumping cases (Ibid.). 
Individual companies can apply for “market economy” treatment from the 
importing country’s regulatory authorities. But the transaction cost of doing so is 
very high, as it demands on-site inspection by the regulatory authorities. Thus, 
only 16 Chinese firms (in all sectors) have been granted “market economy” 
treatment by the European Commission (CD, 11 October 2002). 
In a stark contrast, locally-funded and foreign-financed SMEs may have 
little or no experience of dealing with anti-dumping charges. This resulted in their 
reluctance to counter the anti-dumping charges by releasing sensitive cost and 
pricing information to the relevant authorities (HKET, 7 June 2002). A survey 
revealed that more than half of the Chinese firms involved in anti-dumping 
charges had been reluctant to participate in foreign anti-dumping procedures. 
Subsequently, the Chinese firms were the losers in over 80% of the cases (HKEJ, 
18 December 2001, p. 21). 
No matter how successful the counter-anti-dumping measures are, the 
bottom line is that some SMEs simply do not have the resources to counter anti-
dumping charges.16 In fact, the cash flow of SMEs is so tight that they simply 
cannot wait for the outcome of the arbitration on trade disputes. Rather than 
opening up overseas markets, WTO accession may actually accelerate the 
crowding out process of SMEs in China. 
 3.3 International standards do matter 
Apart from issues directly related to the WTO accession treaties, the 
proliferation of international standards in the global textile and clothing industry is 
vital for the competitiveness of Chinese industry. International standards, such as 
the ISO9000, ISO14000, SA8000 and WRAP, are an immediate challenge for the 
industry in China, with or without WTO accession. 
ISO9000 is mainly concerned with “quality management” (i.e., whether 
the firm has done everything to ensure that its products conform to the customer’s 
requirements), while ISO14000 is primarily about the “environmental 
management system,” i.e. whether the firm has done everything to ensure that a 
product will have the least harmful impact on the environment during production 
or disposal (ISO, 2001).17 SA8000 is focused on the “social accountability” of 
the firm’s activities, including the International Labour Organization’s 
Conventions on Labour Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (SAI, 1997, p.4). 
Similar to SA8000 but focused on apparel, WRAP is the set of “socially 
responsible global standards for apparel manufacturing,” i.e. to ensure that sewn 
products are produced under lawful, humane and ethical conditions (WRAP, 
2001). Getting ISO9000 and ISO14000 certification is one of the pre-conditions 
for securing sub-contracting deals from major U.S. clothing chains, as this is 
normally (though wrongly) regarded as the benchmark for quality and 
environmental friendliness.18 Increasingly, major U.S./EU buyers also demand 
SA8000 or WRAP to fend off allegations from non-government organisations 
(NGOs) that they purchase products manufactured by “sweatshops”. 
Generally, the majority of Chinese firms are willing to adopt ISO9000 
certification, partly to fulfil their customers’ requirements and partly to improve 
quality control processes and productivity through detailed and systematic 
documentation during the production processes.19 For ISO14000 standard, it is 
more costly for firms to implement the standard as it monitors the use of raw 
materials and natural resources, and demands tremendous investment in 
environmentally friendly equipment, monitoring and measurement devices to 
 ensure that the emission of pollutants is minimal, etc. This explains why a number 
of firms are reluctant to implement the ISO14000 standard, as the investment can 
be prohibitively high for some SMEs (Field survey, 2000, 2001). 
Regarding the SA8000 or WRAP certification, they are also too costly for 
a number of clothing firms in China to implement, even if they are willing to 
adopt the system wholeheartedly, since such certification covers almost 
everything, including local working conditions, remuneration, workers’ rights, the 
extent of overtime work, a ban on child labour, etc. (SAI, 1997, pp. 4-8; WRAP, 
2001).20 After inspecting the shop floor of the sub-contractor in Zhejiang, the 
inspectors from Macy’s Department Store (U.S.) requested that the manager 
install air conditioning in the workspace, a request with which the firm has duly 
complied. The Director of this clothing sub-contractor privately admitted that “it 
is impossible to fully comply with all of the requirements laid out by the SA8000 
certification. The production costs are simply too high to remain competitive 
while doing so.” (Field survey, 2001). This is especially the case in overtime work, 
where the standard imposes a limit of 12 hours of overtime per week on top of a 
maximum of 48 hours for a regular shift (SAI, 1997, p. 6).21 Due to the seasonal 
nature of the clothing market, it is very costly for the sub-contractor to employ 
and train more workers during the period of peak market demand and sack them 
during the period of low demand. This explains why overtime work is very 
common in Chinese firms, regardless of their size. 
Second, it is probably impossible to fully implement all the standards in 
SA8000 or WRAP in China. For instance, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for 
the firm to ensure that there is no child labour in the firm, partly due to the fact 
that a large number of workers are involved, most of them migrant workers about 
whose dates of birth the local Public Security Bureau lacks accurate information. 
The widespread availability of false identity cards in China further hampers the 
process of verification. Probably the most difficult item of SA8000 to achieve is 
the demand faced by certified firms to ensure that their suppliers are conforming 
to the same standards of social accountability (Ibid., p. 7). It is too costly to 
demand that all suppliers implement SA8000, as there are dozens of major 
suppliers for a single firm. Large-scale firms may be able to use their market 
 power as leverage on their major suppliers. SMEs, however, simply do not have 
the market power to impose any control over their suppliers, other than product 
requirements. 
The extra costs involved in the certification and implementation of ISO, 
WRAP and SA standards can partially or even totally offset the low nominal 
labour costs of some Chinese firms. For these firms, accession to the WTO by 
China is a non-issue, since most of the tangible effects of the reduction of import 
tariffs and elimination of export quotas will not take effect until 2005. For them, 
the certification and implementation of international standards is more urgent. 
Without certification, they can easily lose their lucrative contracts to competitors 
in Pakistan, Sri Lanka or Vietnam. 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
To conclude, accession to the WTO does matter for the majority of 
Chinese textile and clothing firms from the perspectives of the reduction of import 
tariffs and opening up of distribution channels in China, the eventual elimination 
of export quotas by importing countries, the regulations on trade disputes, etc. 
From the perspective of compliance with international standards, however, 
accession to the WTO matters less for some Chinese firms, especially SMEs. 
Contrary to the conventional argument which says that the elimination of 
export quotas by importing countries will increase the market size of Chinese 
firms, the reduction of Chinese import tariffs and export quotas by importing 
countries are likely to lead to a “win-lose” game for the industry, given the 
differences in competitiveness between firms of various sizes and ownership types. 
First, Chinese firms are competing in the same export markets in North 
America and Europe as other low-cost competitors. The eventual elimination of 
export quotas will benefit export-oriented (foreign-financed) firms as their 
competitive products and pricing are demonstrated by their existing market shares, 
given the high transaction costs on export documentation (including illegal 
transhipment and re-routing, etc.). Rather than enjoying “first mover” advantages, 
the reduction of import tariffs and the elimination of export quotas may actually 
 deprive foreign-financed firms with investments in southern China of the ability to 
use Hong Kong quotas as their competitive advantage. The reduction of import 
tariffs and the opening up of distribution channels in China will subject import-
oriented (locally-funded) firms to more intense competition locally and 
internationally. 
Second, WTO accession will not reduce the incidence of trade disputes in 
the forms of anti-dumping and countervailing suits for at least another 15 years, 
since importing countries are treating China as a “non-market economy” and can 
sanction Chinese imports via the special and product-specific safeguard 
mechanisms. Most large-scale foreign-financed firms in China have the 
experience and capital to deal with anti-dumping suits filed by foreign competitors. 
However, this is normally not the case for locally-funded and foreign-financed 
SMEs. Moreover, the secrecy of the Chinese government surrounding the WTO 
negotiations, as well as the non-disclosure of treaties, certainly does not assist the 
industry in preparing for the accession. The red tape and lack of co-ordination 
between different Chinese bureaux further lower the competitiveness of Chinese 
firms, especially for those aiming at niche markets with short product cycles. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that WTO accession is an important 
event for the Chinese industry, the accession is not an issue for some Chinese 
firms. For them, compliance with international standards is the more immediate 
challenge to their survival. This is because most major overseas buyers are 
requesting that their sub-contractors comply with international standards on 
“quality management,” “environmental management” or “social accountability,” 
in particular ISO9000, ISO14000, SA8000, etc. The recent consolidation in the 
U.S. retailing industry, exemplified by the bankruptcy of the K-mart Corporation, 
has further weakened the bargaining power of smaller sub-contractors. Most firms 
are willing to adopt ISO9000 as, theoretically, it can improve their productivity. 
However, the certification and adoption of international standards on 
“environmental management” and “social accountability” are very costly, and 
some of the treaties are too expensive, if not impossible, to adopt fully, e.g., 
SA8000 forbids the employment of child labour by the certified firm and by its 
suppliers.  
 It may be premature to draw a definite conclusion on the significance of 
the WTO accession for the Chinese textile and clothing industry, but one outcome 
is certain. The process of industrial consolidation is likely to be accelerated. Most 
well-funded (foreign-financed) firms are expecting the WTO accession and can 
invest to improve their productivity and move up the value-added ladder to meet 
the competition. Due to the increasing stringency of international standards and 
the intense competition in low value-added products, a number of SMEs are not 
expected to survive until 2005, when the effects of the ATC materialise. Even 
those who survive post-ATC may not be able to withstand the onslaught of anti-
dumping from importing countries. Paradoxically, this crowding out process of 
SMEs may actually improve the long-term competitiveness of the Chinese 
industry, as most of the crowded out firms are producing excess supplies of low 
value-added products with obsolete equipment.  
To improve the competitiveness of the Chinese industry, the government 
can assist the industrial consolidation by merging the SOEs. Routine workshops 
and technical seminars about the latest developments in products, international 
standards and technical know-how will assist in upgrading the technological and 
value-added level of the industry. Moreover, the National Textile and Clothing 
Industry Bureau can invite the ILO and/or other NGOs to inspect the working 
conditions of Chinese firms by following the strategy of Cambodia (FT, 18 June 
2002). Instead of dealing with the cost-consuming certification processes of 
international standards at the level of the firm, a higher level of transparency 
through scrutiny is one possibility for improving the competitiveness and 
reputation of the Chinese industry. Should the Chinese industry get the 
endorsement of the ILO, the image sensitive TNCs may still place orders from the 
non-certified Chinese firms. This allows the Chinese industry to further improve 
its working standards and competitiveness. 
To counter the expected surge in anti-dumping suits against Chinese firms, 
the government should waste little time in assisting the industry to prepare for 
trade disputes. The government should adopt a proactive approach by issuing 
guidelines and conducting workshops on the possible challenges that the industry 
may encounter during the post-accession period, e.g. how to deal with the 
 expected surge of anti-dumping suits? The reality is that the global competitors of 
the Chinese industry will not just sit there and let Chinese exports conquer their 
domestic markets. 
Trade disputes will be far from over after the WTO accession. The 
Chinese industry cannot take the quota elimination outlined in the ATC for 
granted, as the history of multilateral trade agreements on textile and clothing 
demonstrates (e.g., MFA). First, whether importing countries will indeed 
eliminate up to 49% of their quotas overnight on 31 December 2004 is 
questionable, as this will have far-reaching consequences for their own textile and 
clothing industries. Second, the importing countries may use other pretexts to 
invoke safeguard mechanisms to protect their domestic industries for another 10 
years legitimately. The Chinese government should stand firm in future 
international negotiations whenever the importing country employs safeguard 
mechanisms. Apart from trying to settle any disputes through the WTO’s DSB, 
the government should use its increasing influential economic power for hard 
bargaining, including invoking the “transitional safeguard” measures under the 
WTO rules against imported textile products which can cause damage to the 
Chinese industry. 
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1. For the historical background and politics about the WTO accession, see Yang (2000) and 
Fewsmith (2001). 
2. In this paper, “Chinese firms” is a generic term referring to foreign-financed and locally-funded 
textile and clothing firms located in China. 
3. See Yeung (2001, pp. 3-7) for a detailed classification of FDI in China. 
4. The revealed comparative advantage index is the value of net exports as a percentage of gross 
exports plus imports (Balassa and Bauwens, 1988, p. 7). The closer the index is to positive 1.0, 
the more competitive the industry in the global economy, and vice versa, ceteris paribus. 
5. Unlike the MFA, to which importing countries have applied six times for extensions, Article 9 
of the ATC stipulates that the integration must be completed by 1 January 2005 (Shi, 2001, p. 
54; WTO, 2001C). However, the ATC allows importing countries to “endload”: up to 49% of 
product quotas (with the largest imported value) will not be eliminated until 31 December 2004 
(WTO, 1997).  
6. The original aim of the special safeguard mechanism is to protect member countries against 
damaging surges in imports during the 10-year transition period from the ATC (1995) to the 
realisation of the GATT rules (2005). It is applicable only to products not yet integrated into 
GATT and not already under quantitative restraint (WTO, 2001B). 
7. According to section 334 of the US Uruguay Round Agreement Act, the country of assembly is 
normally treated as the country of origin. This is unfavourable to exporting countries which rely 
on processing trade, such as China (Zhong and Yang, 2000, p. 183). 
8. There are about 300 down coat manufacturers in China but 10 of them controlling two-third of 
the local market (only 70% of 27 million down coats were sold in 2000) (SCMP, 22 October 
2001). 
9. There are 276 export quotas on different categories of textile and clothing products in China, 
with the US (104) and the EU (72) accounting for the lion’s share (Shi, 2001:107). China was 
excluded from the ATC before joining the WTO (Ianchovichina and Martin, 2001, p. 10). 
10. The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (The Anti-Dumping 
Agreement) allows importing countries to take actions against dumping (WTO, 2002). 
11. Thompson (2002, p. 883) argues that geographical clustered foreign-financed garment firms 
are more effective on transferring technology and up-grading the value-added of their 
products than geographical dispersed firms in China. 
 12. The bureaucracy associated with production contracts and other import documentation has 
been documented by Yeung and Mok (2002). 
13. The US government granted PNTR status to China, which entails levying the same tariffs on 
Chinese imports as on other major US trading partners’ imports. The bilateral deals between 
China and the US will be “multi-lateralised” to all WTO members. 
14. For a detailed discussion of the procedures, see chapter 11 of Jackson (2000). 
15. In November 2001, the MOFTEC established the Fair Trade Bureau for Import and Export to 
handle subsidy and anti-dumping issues with foreign countries, and to represent China during 
WTO-administered trade disputes (SCMP, 2 November 2001). 
16. For example, to handle an anti-dumping charge against its exports of automotive replacement 
windscreen to Canada, Fuyao Glass Industry Group in China spent more than three million 
yuan in legal expenses alone (CD, 2 September 2002).  
17. The Oeko-Tex Standard 100, which sets specific noxious limits (e.g. pH values, extractable 
heavy-metals) on all kinds of yarns, fabrics and textile products, is another of the so-called 
“green” standards (Oeko-Tex, 2002). 
18. ISO9000 and ISO14000 are generic management system standards (they are not product 
standards) developed under the guidance of the International Organization for Standardization. 
Both standards concern the production processes of the firm, not the products (ISO, 2001). 
19. Since each batch of products is documented or electronically tagged, any faulty products 
picked up by quality control staff will result in the whole batch being double-checked before 
leaving the factory. With a lower rate of manufacturing faulty products, these documentation 
procedures also improve productivity. 
20. Obviously, there are ways to fulfil the SA8000 or WRAP audit without actually meeting the 
standard, e.g. inducing the workers and factory managers to put on a show during auditing, 
and presenting falsified labour records. 
21. Unlike the SA8000, WRAP just stated that the working hours should not exceed the legal 
limitations of the countries in which apparel is produced (WRAP, 2001). 
 Table 1: The Global Top 10 Exporting and Importing Countries of Textile and Clothing Products in 1990-2000 
EXPORTS of Textiles 
(in US$ billions & percentage share of global exports of textiles) 
EXPORTS of Clothing 
(in US$ billions & percentage share of global exports of clothing ) 
 1990 1995 2000  1990 1995 2000 
China† 7.22 6.92% 13.92 9.30% 16.14 10.25% China† 9.67 8.95% 24.05 15.28% 36.07 18.13% 
S. Korea 6.08 5.83% 12.31 8.22% 12.78 8.12% Italy 11.84 10.96% 14.18 9.01% 13.22 6.64% 
Italy 9.49 9.10% 12.80 8.55% 11.96 7.59% Hong KongΨ 9.27 8.58% 9.54 6.06% 9.94 4.99% 
Taiwan 6.13 5.88% 11.88 7.94% 11.69 7.42% Mexico† 0.59 0.54% 2.73 1.74% 8.70 4.37% 
Germany 14.03 13.46% 14.39 9.61% 11.02 7.00% USA 2.56 2.37% 6.65 4.23% 8.65 4.35% 
USA 5.04 4.83% 7.37 4.92% 10.96 6.96% Germany 7.88 7.30% 7.50 4.77% 6.84 3.44% 
Japan 5.86 5.62% 7.18 4.79% 7.02 4.46% Turkey 3.33 3.08% 6.12 3.89% 6.53 3.28% 
France 6.06 5.81% 7.47 4.99% 6.76 4.29% France 4.67 4.32% 5.62 3.57% 5.43 2.73% 
Belgium 6.37 6.11% 7.88 5.26% 6.40 4.07% India‡ 2.53 2.34% 4.11 2.61% 5.15 2.59% 
India‡ 2.18 2.09% 4.36 2.91% 5.09 3.23% S. Korea 7.88 7.30% 4.96 3.15% 5.03 2.53% 
Top 10: 68.46 65.66% 99.56 66.49% 99.81 63.38% Top 10: 60.22 55.76% 85.45 54.30% 105.54 53.05% 
World: 104.27 100% 149.73 100% 157.46 100% World: 108.00 100% 157.37 100% 198.94 100% 
IMPORTS of Textiles 
(in US$ billions & percentage share of global imports of textiles) 
IMPORTS of Clothing 
(in US$ billions & percentage share of global imports of clothing) 
 1990 1995 2000  1990 1995 2000 
USA 6.73 6.25% 10.44 6.50% 15.71 9.37% USA 26.98 24.07% 41.37 24.80% 66.39 31.59% 
China† 5.29 4.91% 10.91 6.79% 12.83 7.65% Japan 8.74 7.79% 18.76 11.25% 19.71 9.38% 
Germany 11.87 11.01% 12.49 7.77% 9.32 5.56% Germany 20.41 18.21% 24.54 14.71% 19.31 9.19% 
UK 7.02 6.51% 7.70 4.79% 6.91 4.12% UK 6.96 6.21% 8.34 5.00% 12.99 6.18% 
France 7.60 7.05% 7.49 4.66% 6.75 4.03% France 8.38 7.48% 10.29 6.17% 11.48 5.46% 
Italy 6.13 5.69% 6.39 3.98% 6.12 3.65% Italy 2.58 2.30% 4.65 2.79% 6.07 2.89% 
Mexico†Ф 0.99 0.92% 1.77 1.10% 6.10 3.64% Netherlands 4.77 4.25% 5.01 3.00% 4.83 2.30% 
Japan 4.11 3.81% 5.99 3.73% 4.94 2.95% Belgium 3.59 3.20% 4.38 2.62% 4.81 2.29% 
CanadaФ 2.33 2.16% 3.20 1.99% 4.13 2.46% Spain 1.65 1.47% 2.61 1.56% 3.77 1.79% 
Belgium 3.58 3.32% 4.15 2.59% 3.63 2.16% CanadaФ 2.39 2.13% 2.69 1.61% 3.69 1.76% 
Top 10: 55.64 51.64% 70.53 43.91% 76.43 45.59% Top 10: 86.44 77.12% 122.63 73.52% 153.05 72.82% 
World: 107.75 100% 160.62 100% 167.65 100% World: 112.09 100% 166.81 100% 210.17 100% 
Notes:  †: Includes significant shipments through processing zones.    ‡: 1999 instead of 2000.   Ф: Imports are valued f.o.b.  
Ψ: Domestic exports only. In 2000, the re-export value of clothing products in Hong Kong reached US$14.28 billion. 
Sources: Compiled from Textile Asia, 1997, pp. 53, 59; WTO, 2001D. 
 Table 2: The Chinese Textile and Clothing Industry in 1980-2001 
 1980 1990 1995 2001 
Number of enterprises (in units of 10,000) 3.79 8.38 10.25 2.45¶
(10.1%) (7.1%) (8.0%) (14.3%)
of which SOEs:  0.33 0.32
of which loss-making SOEs:  0.16 --- 
Number of employees (in 10,000 persons) 502 1,243 1,243 507
(4.8%) (8.8%) (8.3%) (13.2%)
Gross industrial output value (in 100 million 
yuan) 
885 3,735 8,397 10,813
(17.7%) (16.2%) (12.6%) (11.3%)
Value-added (in 100 million yuan)  1,494 2,690
  (9.7%) (9.5%)
Profit taxes (in 100 million yuan) 165.06 229.62 266.24 358.71§
(14.2%) (7.8%) (4.3%) (11.5%)§
of which loss incurred by loss-making SOEs:  78.60 76.57§
of which loss incurred by all SOEs:  33.50 3.74§
Fixed assets investment (in 100 million yuan) 38.52 129.50 309.99 266.02†
(4.2%) (2.9%) (1.5%) (0.94%)†
Export value (in US$100 million) 44.1 167.8 379.7 498.4
(24.1%) (27.0%) (25.5%) (18.7%)
textiles export value (in US$100 million): 27.6 99.3 139.2 130.1§
of which SOEs  81.0§
of which collectives  5.4§
of which sanzi qiye  43.2§
clothing export value (in US$100 million): 16.5 68.5 240.5 300.6§
of which SOEs  181.9§
of which collectives  14.6§
of which sanzi qiye  103.4§
Notes: 
Figures in brackets are the percentage shares of textiles and clothing in the 
corresponding values of the national total. 
Sanzi qiye incorporates three forms of direct foreign-invested enterprises: equity 
joint ventures, contractual joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned ventures. 
†: 1998 data. 
§: 1999 data. 
¶: Another source of information suggested that there are more than 70,000 textile 
and clothing firms in China (SCMP, 7 January 2002). 
Source: Compiled from Shi, 2001, pp. 67-8,81-2,87,120 and NBS, 2000, 2002. 
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